

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY NEA/IRN:CWNAAS:S/P:JKALICKI:OES:HBENGELSDORFF

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

NEA:SSOBER

PM:GVEST

S/S - MR. BORG

C:HSOHNENFELDT

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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, IR

SUBJECT:FRG/IRAN AGREEMENT

1. I ASKED FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN TO COME IN TODAY AND WAS STRONGLY CRITICAL THAT THE FRG/IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED TOMORROW AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO THE PROVISION OF REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY. A SEPARATE MESSAGE WILL MORE FULLY COVER THE MEETING. I EXPECT THAT THE GERMANS WILL IN FORM THE SHAH OF OUR DEMARCHE AND I WANT TO REDUCE ITS IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH HIM. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY AUDIENCE AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE LONG BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE EMPHASIZED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN, AS

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WELL AS IN OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS

AND OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE NEED (A) TO AVOID PREMATURE COMMITMENT TO NEW REPROCESSING FACILITIES AND (B) FOR EFFECTIVE BINATIONAL/MULTINATIONAL, GUARANTEES FOR ANY FACILITY IF AND WHEN IT IS ECONOMICALLY REQUIRED.

-- IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU AND DR. ETEMAD WE HAVE WELCOMED YOUR STRONG INTEREST IN MINIMIZING PROLIFERATION RISKS IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD AND IN TAKING A STRONG LEADERSHIP ROLE IN DETERRING THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITIES. AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR CONVERSATION WITH DR. SEAMANS, WE HAVE URGED IRAN TO AVOID MAKING PREMATURE COMMITMENTS TO REPROCESSING AT THIS TIME, GIVEN THE TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES IN THIS AREA.

-- THE FRG RECENTLY INFORMED US, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS PROCEEDING WITH A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDED A REPROCESSING COMMITMENT TO IRAN. IN RESPONSE TO FRG REQUESTS FOR COMMENTS ON THE ARRANGEMENTS, WE WERE BOUND TO EMPHASIZE OUR PERCEPTION OF THE NEED TO AVOID A PREMATURE REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT COMMITMENT, ALTHOUGH WE WELCOME THE INDICATIONS THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS, AND WOULD BE AT LEAST BI-NATIONAL IN CHARACTER.

-- WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE FRG/IRANIAN AGREEMENT WILL BE SUBJECT TO WIDESPREAD MISINTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM. TO MITIGATE ANY SUCH MISPERCEPTIONS, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOUR MAJESTY WERE TO INDICATE PUBLICLY THAT ANY IRANIAN MOVE TO PROCEED WITH REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT IS MANY YEARS IN THE FUTURE AND WOULD BE DIRECTED IN WAYS DESIGNED TO REINFORCE EFFECTIVELY OUR MUTUAL NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES.

-- WE HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN IRAN'S ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE NPT AND WISH TO STRESS THAT OUR PREOCCUPATIONS IN THIS REGARD ARE PART OF A GENERAL GLOBAL CONCERN. OUR RESPONSE TO THE FRG WAS ALSO BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE GENERAL PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED FOR THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY AT A TIME WHEN WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER COMMITMENTS OF THIS
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CHARACTER SHOULD AT LEAST BE DEFERRED UNTIL BETTER INTERNATIONAL NORMS ARE DEvised TO DEAL WITH OVER-ALL PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE PROBLEMS.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESS REACTION TO THE FRG-IRAN AGREEMENT AND WE WILL BE COMPELLED PUBLICLY TO STATE THAT WE OPPOSED THE PREMATURE COMMITMENT ON REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY BY THE FRG. YOU

SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THESE COMMENTS AS REFLECTING ANY

DOUBT ON OUR TRUST OF IRAN AND OUR FULL CONFIDENCE IN
IRAN'S COMMITMENTS TO NON-PROLIFERATION. BUT, COMMENT
MAY BE NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF OUR GENERAL POSITION
ON THESE QUESTIONS.

-- ON OUR PART, WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS ON
NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN AND LOOK FORWARD TO BEING
A PART OF IRAN'S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A VIGOROUS NUCLEAR
POWER PROGRAM. WE WERE GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY OUR DIS-
CUSSIONS WITH DR. ETEMAD IN APRIL AND LOOK FORWARD TO A
SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR
FUTURE. ROBINSON

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